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ABSTRACT 
With regard to making war, the European Union (EU) is either characterized as being “from Ve-
nus” or as having made the transition from “garrison state” to “civilian state.” Drawing on the work from 
Charles Tilly, this thesis will show that neither characterization provides an accurate depiction of Euro-
pean behavior where the use of coercive force is concerned. To best understand the behavior of the EU 
it is necessary to conceive of it as a certain kind of state, and to highlight the ways in which peacekeep-
ing and humanitarian interventions serve the same purposes as classical war-making. This thesis will use 
the examples of interventions in the former Yugoslavia and Iraq as case studies. 
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1     INTRODUCTION  
“For the field of battle is the place of life and death and war the road to 
survival and ruin.” – Sun Tzu 
“War is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our 
will.” - Carl von Clausewitz 
 
“Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.”1 Robert Kagan wrote this now 
(in)famous sentence in 2002 in an essay for the Hoover Institutions Policy Review in which he argued 
that Europeans were transitioning into a “post-historical paradise” beyond their historical preoccupation 
with war and hard power.2 This transition, Kagan wrote, had its roots in the same philosophical vein as 
the 1960’s Otopolitik which turned away from militarism in light of the tragedy wrought by two World 
Wars which raged across the European continent, consuming empires in their conflagrations. As the 
United States (US) grew stronger in the capacity to wage war during and after the Cold War, developing 
into what the French foreign minister would go on to call a hyperpower, political differences between 
Europe and the United States grew.3 In international affairs, the states of the European Union (EU) de-
veloped what some termed “the strategy of the weak,” attempting to constrain American power abroad 
without exerting more power themselves.4 Kagan’s piece is often criticized as being a sort of neo-
conservative apologetics for the cowboy diplomacy of Bush-era unilateralism, but Kagan was not the 
only person to articulate an understanding of the difference in the way Americans and Europeans per-
ceive and use military power. And even if much of the ideology behind Kagan’s Project for the New 
                                                          
1
 Kagan 2002. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Safire 2003. 
4
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American Century has been disproven by the debacle that was the illegal invasion of Iraq, it remains true 
that up until now the EU has been either unwilling or unable to challenge American military hegemony.  
The cartoonist Pat Oliphant penned an image after the 2006 World Cup in which he commented 
on the differences in the American and European psyches where force and power were concerned.  In a 
move reminiscent on George Carlin’s “Baseball vs. Football,” Oliphant contrasts perceptions of European 
soccer and American football (Figure 1). The European soccer players are depicted as slim, effete and 
feminized as they prance gleefully across the grassy field clutching their man-purses. The American 
footballers, conversely, are portrayed as dumb, hulking brutes stoically hacking each other to bits in a 
medieval pile-on of carnage and mayhem. While the cartoon is certainly more a comment on how Amer-
icans and Europeans perceive each other rather than on the reality behind these perceptions, it helps to 
remember that the differences between the US and the EU in the capacity to wage war and the willing-
ness to use it were and are very real. But, is the EU is a product of a new kind of thinking brought about 
in response to the grotesque bellicosity of a Westphalian/realist international system, or is this in inac-
curate understanding of its nature? 
 
Figure 1.1: In the Wake of the World Cup by Pat Oliphant. 
3 
Is it correct to assume that Europeans have given up their preoccupation with force altogether – 
that they really are from Venus? Consider that Europe still accounts for a full 20% of the World’s military 
spending and that the states that make up the EU spend about the same percentage of their GDPs on 
the military as does China, India, Pakistan or South Korea – states not normally thought of as having giv-
en up their claims to use force.5 France and the United Kingdom (UK) still possess nuclear weapons while 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and Turkey maintain nuclear weapons sharing agreements 
through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).6 It cannot be denied that the EU is a product of 
a new kind of politics on the European continent – one that views with a mix of shame and dread its im-
perial past.  But if the EU is also an experiment in social, political and economic integration, what kind of 
entity is the EU?  And more importantly, how can we expect the EU to behave in the realm of interna-
tional affairs in light of this understanding? These are the question that must be answered if one is to 
make any meaningful comparison between the United States and the EU.    
1.1 Literature Review 
James Sheehan writes that the European idea as embodied in the EU is one born of a commit-
ment to abandon the obsession with antagonism and hard power characterized by its warlike past and 
instead focus on the economic, social and cultural needs of its citizens. In this transition from “garrison 
state” to “civilian state” the military aspirations of European states were subordinated to diplomats who 
valued compromise over violence.7 This phenomenon could be witnessed in everything from the for-
mation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 to the transformative power of the 
appeal of freedom and prosperity that finally vanquished the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. Dissi-
dents in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary transformed their societies not with bombs and guns but 
by “living within the truth” and refusing to accept the moral emptiness of the repressive regimes that 
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4 
sought to deny them their basic rights and freedoms.8 The fall of the Iron Curtain thus should be seen as 
a triumph of Kantian liberal peace that even Gorbachev was forced to acknowledge when he declared in 
1988 that "force and the threat of force . . . should not be instruments of foreign policy.”9 For Western 
Europeans in particular, the end of empire freed their states to focus on more prosperous and liberal 
societies and as these societies transformed, so too did their expectations of the manner in which the 
state was to behave in the realm of international affairs. Indeed, the largest demonstration in European 
history was held to protest war and the protest across the continent were marked by their conspicuous 
lack of violence and the degree to which the crowds were filled with ordinary families rather than 
masked anarchists.10 
The shift in policy preferences among Europeans necessitated the death of an institution which 
had long been used to glorify not only the state but also violence as well – the conscript army. Conscript 
armies had fought in both World Wars, but as integration across the continent continued through the 
second half of the twentieth century, Europeans began to demand their governments focus on different 
priorities like universal health care and education.11 Belgium ended its draft in 1992, The Netherlands 
ended their in 1993 and France ended its draft in 1996.12  Indeed, the only EU states which currently en-
force conscription are Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece and Norway.13 The US also ended its 
conscription in 1973 but this was not the result of a philosophical shift in priorities along European lines 
but rather because Americans expect the hard power obligations of foreign policy to be carried out by “a 
relatively small portion of the population, whose sacrifices are honored but not shared by the larger so-
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9
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 Sheehan 2008 
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 Sheehan 2011 
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 Ibid. 
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 Deutsche Welle 2008. German conscription ended in 2011 after both Sheehan’s article and the 
Deutsche Welle piece were written.  
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ciety.”14 In this sense, Sheehan argues that the US is also a kind of civilian state, albeit one with exten-
sive military obligations and different expectations where the use of coercive force are concerned.15  
However, unlike the US, the EU will never be a superpower because of a lack of willingness on the 
part of Europeans to support increased spending, the lack of effective decision making institutions capa-
ble of organizing a unified and coherent security policy and the fact that membership in the EU is con-
ceived of in terms of rights and privileges rather than in terms of obligations and commitments.16 
But Sheehan concedes that most Europeans want the EU to be a superpower capable of balancing the 
power of the US and creating what Samuel Huntington referred to as a truly multipolar world.17 
As a civilian state thus described by Sheehan (itself a concept introduced by Lasswell in 1937) the EU has 
relied on the US, through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to provide for its defense. However, 
member states of the EU have at times expressed a desire to build an independent military capacity, as 
realized in the creation of the European Battle Groups and the references in treaties to rapid reaction 
forces and a European security and defense policy. 
In 1984 the Western European Union (WEU) was revived for the purposes of creating an inde-
pendent “European identity in the areas of security and defense.”18 Taken over by the EU in 1999, the 
goal is to create a rapid reaction force of 100,000 troops, 400 aircraft and 100 naval vessels with a re-
serve support of between 120,000 and 200,000 which could be deployed within 60 days for up to one 
year and which would execute the Petersburg tasks of “humanitarian and rescue missions; peacekeep-
ing duties; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”1920 In 2003, the 
European Security Strategy (EES) was adopted in December and formed the framework for the Common 
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Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).21 The EES 
identified five key threat elements the response to which would be within the purview of this European 
rapid reaction force: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state 
failure and organized crime.22  
This change in a European willingness to embrace a robust defense and security policy was 
nowhere more dramatic than in London – long the home of the most strident Euroscepticism – in 1998 
when Tony Blair embraced the adoption of what would become the EES.23 Twin European failures in 
Bosnia and Kosovo were widely recognized as a major impetus for renewed support for militarizing the 
EU in the UK, France, Germany and other EU states.2425 In fact, in the decade from 1994-2004, Euro-
pean states doubled the number of troops deployed abroad, including those involved in Operation En-
during Freedom in Afghanistan.2627 However, despite heavy involvement of EU member states’ armed 
forces in UN and NATO peacekeeping missions as well as Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, 
the EU as such remains incapable of deploying a military force capable of conducting long-term com-
bat operations.28 The paradox is that a majority of Europeans believe that the EU is the proper author-
ity to be invested with the power to make decisions regarding the CSDP.2930 Additionally, even though 
Europeans have rejected the use of force for imperial gain, the military remains the institution in 
which they have the highest confidence.31 The idea that Europeans are from Venus cannot account for 
these paradoxes. Indeed, elites and political leaders in the EU have come to realize that should a 
9/11-type attack occur on European soil, the EU would be unable to respond militarily without heavy 
US support and this dependency on the arbitrary power of a foreign entity is perhaps as great a threat 
to continued EU security as terrorism, organized crime or a resurgent Russia.32   
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The explanation for the drive for a rapid reaction force and a coherent CSDP is better under-
stood if it becomes possible to more accurately characterize the EU itself. Charles Tilly famously re-
marked that wars make states and states make war.33 This relationship between war-making and 
state-making is mutually reinforcing as political elites seek to concentrate capitalizing and/or coercive 
powers within a central authority. Tilly relies on a Weberian conception of the state, that being a “co-
ercion wielding organization that [is] distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise[s] clear 
priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories”34 The reason why 
war and preparation for war are important for state formation is because it involves elites “extracting 
the means of war from others” who are reluctant to give up their resources without either being com-
pelled or compensated (or both).35 As states change overtime, they pass through four phases of ex-
traction: 
1. Patrimonialism:  the feudal/tribal era; 
2. Brokerage:  the era of the mercenary; 
3. Nationalization: the era of mass armies; and, 
4. Specialization: the era of specialization and division of labor.36 
 
Tilly also divides states up into one of three categories, each of which calibrates the balance coercive 
and capitalizing power differently: 
1. Coercion-intensive states: elites compel, through coercion, their population into 
providing the means to make war; 
2. Capital-intensive states: elites bargain with others to provide the means to make 
war – also called systems of fragmented sovereignty; and 
3. Capitalized-coercion states: elites interact with holders of capital in a way which 
mutually reinforces the authority of each – coercive power is concentrated in the 
state but the state answers to the desires of the holders of capital.   
 
Tilly argues that over time, the states adopting the capitalized-coercion mode came to dominate Euro-
pean affairs, with a few notable exceptions like the Dutch Republic.  States which did so are called na-
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tional states, or states which Tilly defines as, “states governing multiple contiguous regions and their 
cities by means of centralized, differentiated and autonomous structures.”37  
National states, like France and Spain, grew to dominate continental Europe because they were 
able to adopt forms of warfare that temporarily crushed all rivals on the continent and then replicated 
these forms of government abroad in the form of colonial empires.38 In yet another paradox of Europe-
an political reality, the dominance of the national state through war actually led to the civilianization of 
European states because the building up of large military apparatuses requires large bureaucracies 
staffed by civilians who then act as agents of the states to bargain with elites to obtain capital and re-
sources for effective war-making while participants in the war effort acquired claims on the state and 
the waging of wars led to an increase in debt which encouraged state intervention in national econo-
mies.39 Thus, as national states continued to excel in the waging of war, their populations, bearing the 
burden of the war effort, saw an increase in political capital which gave them power to demand services 
of the state while elites used their power as holders of capital to impose limitations on state power or 
even advance an agenda through the coercive power of the state. To put this another way, the waging 
of war leads to the creation of national states and the civilianization of government and politics for the 
following reasons: 
1. The effort required to build and sustain military forces requires the creation of bu-
reaucracies staffed by civilians which later come to constrain the military; 
2. Bureaucrats acting on behalf of the state bargain with civilian groups that hold the 
resources necessary for war-making, which gives these groups enforceable claims 
on the state; 
3. Expansion of state capacity during wartime becomes permanent, leading to the ex-
pansion of the power of the bureaucracy; 
4. Participants in the war effort acquire claims on the state which are deferred during 
wartime but which are renewed following war; and, 
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5. Debt incurred during war leads to creation of new bureaucracies created to service 
the debt, which then act as agents of the state capable of intervening in national 
economies.40 
 
Parkinson’s Law tells us that the work of the state expands so as to fill the time available for its 
completion.41 State-making is an ongoing process. If war is the engine that drives the state, then legiti-
macy is the gasoline that fuels the engine. The most commonly accepted definition of legitimacy is one 
that prioritizes the consent of the governed. However, Tilly defines legitimacy as the “probability that 
other authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority.”42 If the authority in question has 
a monopoly on the use of force, the elites, as other authorities, will generally act to confirm the deci-
sions of the state out of fear of retaliation but also in order to maintain an environment of stability 
which will preserve the power and privilege built up by elites. Thus, external war-making on the part of 
the state serves internal state-making purposes because the legitimacy of the actions taken by the state 
are confirmed domestically by powerful elites whose positions are then enhanced by the state, either 
through internal coercive means or by the granting of ever greater influence in the decision making pro-
cess (what public policy scholars might call a form of agency capture).43 But legitimacy can also be con-
ferred internationally as well by other states or by international institutions like the UN or international 
courts. 
If the EU, then, can be treated as a state according Tilly’s typology and it is possible to discern 
the type balance currently struck along capitalizing-coercive continuum, then it becomes much more 
possible to compare it to other states, like the US, and draw conclusions based on that comparison. The 
objection could be raised that comparing the EU and the US are like comparing apples and oranges as 
the EU is far too heterogeneous and decentralized in nature to ever be a state. The response to this crit-
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icism is that the states that make up the EU are not themselves heterogeneous and yet they have func-
tioned for centuries, waging wars, forming coalitions and winning and losing empires more effectively 
than any proper nation-state: 
Within Europe itself, perhaps twentieth-century Portugal, Albania, 
Greece, Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark all approached 
the mark [of nation-state] at one moment or another - and even in 
those countries such regions as Lapland and Macedonia introduce sig-
nificant heterogeneity. Despite much myth-making to the contrary, such 
large states as France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Spain all 
hosted visibly, vigorously heterogeneous peoples.44 
 
As for being decentralized, Tilly’s conception of a state does not require the degree of centralization 
seen in modern national states. Indeed, the Dutch Republic remained a state of fragmented sovereignty 
in the brokerage phase during its entire golden age and managed to create the Dutch East India Compa-
ny which ran a trading empire which encompassed the whole of the Indonesian Archipelago and held 
additional trading ports across coastal India and Sub-Saharan Africa. This it did while renting its armies 
and navies and striking bargains with formally independent elites in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and other 
commercial cities.45 Additionally, and as well be detailed below, the US began its post-colonial history as 
a non-homogeneous, capital-intensive state in the brokerage stage of extraction. 
1.2 Expected Results 
If Tilly’s claim that wars make states and states make wars is correct, then a careful comparison of 
the war-making activities of the US and the EU will yield new insight into the character of the EU as a 
state and an understanding as why the EU functions as it does and to the possible future of European 
integration. His Excellency Joao Vale De Almeida, Ambassador and Head of Delegation of the European 
Union to the United States, remarked that Europe today is a community united around ideas like peace, 
tolerance, democracy and human rights; but that in twenty years’ time or so, perhaps defense will be-
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come the “new frontier of European integration” as individual member states will no longer be able to 
afford to compete military powers like China and the US.46 There is perhaps no one in a better position 
to make this assertion than Ambassador De Almeida. If he is indeed correct and it is possible that the 
headline goals of the ESS will someday be realized, then a more thorough understanding of the EU as a 
state should yield some understanding as to the shape and character of that frontier. Tilly’s theory sug-
gests that the relationship between war-making and state-making dictates how states function, and if 
the behavior of the EU in war conforms to expectations of a capital intensive state in the brokerage 
phase of extraction then one possible explanation for the current structure and functioning of the EU 
will have been provided. 
2     EXPERIMENT 
The central theory to be tested here is that wars make states and states make war. War is a means 
of “attacking rivals outside the territory already claimed by the state.”47 States engage in war to achieve 
compliance in order to gain some advantage deemed valuable, be it security, money, goods, access to 
resources or to establish “buffer zones” against perceived threats.48 The typology of the state, the phase 
of extraction and the character of the rival all determine the type of warfare that will be employed. The 
external interests of the state’s dominant classes also obviously determine whether or not and how the 
state chooses to engage in war-making.4950 If states are defined as coercion wielding organizations, then 
for the purposes of this thesis war is the means by which the state uses its military power to coerce oth-
er actors, usually states, into compliance for some end. The states tested theoretically will be the EU and 
the US. If the theory is correct, the EU should prove to be a capital-intensive state in the brokerage 
                                                          
46
 World Affairs Council of Atlanta 2013 
47
 Tilly 1990 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 Tilly 1985 
50
 Tilly 1990 
12 
phase of extraction while the US should prove to be a capitalized-coercion state in the specialization 
phase of extraction. 
The academic value of this thesis will be that Tilly’s central theory, including his typology of states 
and phases of extraction theories, has yet to be applied to compare manners of war-making of the EU 
and the US. Furthermore,  while Tilly’s work concerned itself mainly with the kinds of warfare that dom-
inated the last millennia on the European continent, this thesis will attempt to update the theory by in-
cluding peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions in the operationalization of war-
making. In so doing, a better understanding of the nature of the EU should be achieved as well as insight 
into possible future scenarios concerning European integration and the fate of the EU. Finally, if the the-
ory can be supported, then the ground will have been laid for future work on war-making engaged in by 
other states like India, China or Russia and for an expansion of the theory to address the relationship of 
war-making and identity creation, which Tilly was also concerned with in other works not cited here. 
2.1 Research Design 
This thesis will employ a most-similar systems design using case studies to determine the relation-
ship between the dependent variable, state-making, and the dependent variable, war-making. Tilly’s 
central hypothesis, that wars make states, will be examined through case-studies of war-making opera-
tions engaged in by the EU and the US, and the hypothesis will either be supported or rejected. Tilly’s 
conclusion, that national states are most successful because they are better at making war, will be ex-
amined to the degree that this conclusion may provide some insight as to the future of European inte-
gration. To avoid the problems inherent in comparing cases across time, war-making operations from 
1992-2012 only will be considered. The cases selected will be war-making operations undertaken in the 
following theaters: 
1. The Former Yugoslavia (1993-2004) 
2. Afghanistan, and by extension Pakistan (2001-2012*) 
*Operations in Afghanistan remain ongoing as of the writing of this thesis. 
13 
 
The cases selected above have been included because both the EU and the US undertook war-making 
operations in each against the same rivals but differed in the means by which they made war. If the the-
oretical framework governing war-making decisions laid out by Tilly is correct, then the type of coercive 
measures applied should match up with the typology and extractive phase of each state. 
The EU, as a capital intensive state in the brokerage phase of extraction, should exhibit a frag-
mented and decentralized decision-making process with a great deal of control exerted at the sub-state 
level while military force should be rented or purchased in some way and war-making should be under-
taken only under the limitations imposed by elites acting independently of state control. The US, as a 
capitalized-coercive state in the specialization phase of extraction, should exhibit a highly centralized 
decision-making process with a great deal of control exerted at the state level while military force 
should be specialized and nationalized and war-making should be undertaken where the interest of the 
elites are in concert with the interest of the state. 
In subsequent sections of this thesis, the reader will note that an interview with an EU official is 
referenced on several occasions. This interview was arranged through His Excellency Joao Vale De Al-
meida, Ambassador and Head of Delegation of the European Union to the United States after the World 
Affairs Council Luncheon which took place on June 27th. The interview was conducted by phone on Au-
gust 3rd with a specialist in EU defense and security policy who spoke on condition of anonymity. A copy 
of the questions asked during this interview is included in the appendix (Appendix B). 
2.1.1 A defense of the EU-US comparison 
For the purposes of this thesis, the EU will be treated as a state. Article One of the Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of the State says that, “The state as a person of international law 
should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) gov-
14 
ernment; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”51 The EU maintains a monopoly 
on coercive means through the application of the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the Treaty on European 
Union, by stipulating that member states shall commit to providing military and civilian assets necessary 
to the operational capacity of the EU with regard to the CSDP and CFSP while adding the caveat that 
war-making operations shall be entered into on condition of unanimity.5253 So, while members of the EU 
maintain separate defense forces and private armies which can act independently of the EU, none can 
claim to take war-making action on behalf of the whole nor can any one member bring to bear the coer-
cive force of the EU for its own ends or engage in war-making for interests contrary to or in conflict with 
the interests of the EU. Furthermore, no member may take undertake war against another member.54 
Indeed, security and defense has been rendered a community competency by treaty; however, all deci-
sion making with regards to the use of joint European forces requires unanimity within the European 
Council – a fact which perhaps explains why the headline goals have never been met and why European 
battle groups have never been deployed.55 
However, the EU started as the ECSC in 1951, which was nothing more than an economic alliance 
designed to prevent rather than enable war. As integration across Europe widened and deepened, 
members formed the European Economic Community (EEC) which was designed as an international or-
ganization to facilitate trade and create a common market.56 At this point what would become the EU 
still had no means of extracting the means for coercive war – it was not until the signing of the Treaty on 
European Union in Maastricht that a unifying (albeit loosely) political framework was created and NATO 
was established as the primary provider of defense for the continent, thus making the EU a capital-
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intensive state in the brokerage phase of extraction.57 For these reasons, the EU qualifies as a capital-
intensive state for the purposes of this thesis. NATO will be treated as the coercive force utilized by the 
EU because the EU lacks a unified military force of its own while 21 member states as of 2012 shared 
membership in NATO (28 states) and the EU (27 states).  Furthermore, the NATO-EU Declaration on Eu-
ropean Security and Defense Policy as ratified in 2002 and affirmed (and reaffirmed) by treaty. 
With regard to the appropriateness of comparing the EU with the US, the US was once also a capital 
intensive state with fragmented sovereignty. Parallels between this European state-making and the 
American state-making immediately come to mind.  When Americans revolted in 1775 they were far 
from a unified national state, to inject Tilly’s terminology, but rather a collection of disunited states 
which had temporarily set aside their individual sovereign interests and sectional alliances in order to 
fight a common enemy in Great Britain.58 The former colonies would hardly have qualified as a national 
state even after gaining independence since, far from unifying Americans, the Revolutionary War ampli-
fied or accentuated already exiting differences and rivalries between the newly independent states.59 
The US, like the EU’s forerunners the ECSC and the EEC, began as an “experiment of international coop-
eration” intended to stave off war between the sovereign parties involved and protect them from en-
croaching external threats.60  
As pointed out by Tocqueville, the Constitution that resulted from the cooperation between the 
plenipotentiaries of the sovereign states in 1787 was alone inadequate to forge anything resembling a 
national state among Americans previously subjected to British rule.61 The American response to Shays’ 
Rebellion where reminiscent of those coercive and capitalistic responses of early Western European 
states as they moved from patrimonialism to specialization, however, the state-making process begun at 
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the Constitutional Convention in the aftermath of Shays’ Rebellion would not begin to enter its speciali-
zation phase until after the conclusion of the Civil War and the US would not emerge as a capitalized-
coercive or national-state until after.6263 
Indeed, it was the US’ drive towards expansion after the Civil War, culminating in the imperialistic 
phase of US foreign relations, that finally marked the transition of the US into that of a national state, 
when the interests of the decision-making dominant classes were expressed as much in terms of “the 
redemption of the world” and the “repression of barbarism” as in the securing of new ports, strategic 
resources, or protection against European rivals.64 Therefore, as the US, like the EU, is a heterogeneous 
state (as shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2) that has moved through the various phases of extraction and 
through the various stages of Tilly’s typology, the comparison is appropriate. 
 
Source: https://figures.boundless.com/4ff32b9c246b709a9cd78fc2/raw/census-2000-data-top-us-ancestries-by-county.svg 
Figure 2.1: Heterogeneity of the US (Language and Ethnicity in the US) 
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Source: http://www.eurominority.eu/version/maps/map-native-people-europe.asp 
Figure 2.2: Heterogeneity of the EU (Language Groups in Europe 
2.1.2 A defense of peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions as war-making 
In examining the cases previously listed, EU peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions will be 
compared with US military operations and humanitarian interventions. This thesis argues that peace-
keeping and humanitarian interventions are comparable to war-making within the theoretical frame-
work previously outlined since they serve the same purposes as war, namely in either coercing an out-
side rival to acquiesce to the will of the state making war or in satisfying the strategic needs of the state, 
and because they involve a level of military deployment that reinforces the state-making mechanisms 
outlined in Tilly’s theoretical approach. 
NATO’s involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo are both expressed in terms of providing security, an end 
desired by dominant classes within the EU for the very simple reason that a destabilized Balkan region 
threatens the security of surrounding EU member states and can serve as a hub for Islamic terrorists and 
18 
inspiration for global jihadist. Indeed, the architect of the Dayton Accords was quoted in 2005 as saying 
that the Bosnian mujahedeen were linked to al Qaeda in Afghanistan and that a destabilized Balkan re-
gion would serve as a recruiting ground for terrorists while also destabilizing southern Europe. .65 In-
deed, failure on the part of western powers to respond to the genocide in Bosnia in a timely manner led 
to an influx of Muslims from North Africa and Arab states in the Middle East who went to Bosnia to fight 
against the Serbs.66 Many of these mujahedeen would later use the skills and battle-experience they 
learned in Bosnia against Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Even the United Nations (UN) has come to characterize peacekeeping in terms of force – making 
war to create the peace. To quote the Brahimi Report, “Furthermore, as the United Nations has bitterly 
and repeatedly discovered over the last decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fun-
damental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular, is to succeed.”
67
 Within 
the framework of this thesis peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions are war-making operations 
carried out to further the interests of the state taking action, as defined by the dominant class or elites and 
the operations undertaken will vary depending on the character of the rival, namely whatever group or 
entity is targeted by the military arm of said operation. 
2.2      Case Selection 
For each case, this thesis will examine:  
1. What coercive means were employed by the state; 
2. How these means were legitimated either from within or outside the state; and 
3. How war-making facilitated state-making in each state. 
 
This thesis will not concern itself with evaluating the effectiveness of the action for the purposes of 
proving or disproving the hypothesis. The effectiveness of each war-making action will be considered 
when drawing conclusions as to the future of the EU as a state in the previously referenced typology 
only insofar as they advanced the state-making capacities of the state in question. 
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3 RESULTS 
3.1 Military Operations 
3.1.1 Former Yugoslavia 
All peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions in the former Yugoslavia, until 2004, were carried out 
under the auspices of NATO. Securing external legitimacy, from global powers and/or international insti-
tutions allowed NATO to maintain a monopoly on the use of force in the Balkans, an important accom-
plishment which allowed operations in some cases to last for years.  
Table 3.1 US and EU Operations in Former Yugoslavia 
 
Operation Deliberate Force was conducted between August 30th and September 14th with the 
US, UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Turkey all contributing forces to a humani-
tarian intervention conducted almost entirely by air. Targets included Serbian heavy weapons installa-
tions involved in the siege of Sarajevo and command and control structures of the Serb supported Re-
publika Srpska. In just over two weeks, NATO forces flew 3515 sorties dropping of 1026 bombs at 338 
individual targets during the length of the operation (Table 3.1).68 Contributing NATO states agreed up-
on the operational goal of securing a safe-haven for Bosnian Muslims, however US policy in the region 
was to shift the balance of power in the former Yugoslavia towards Croatia, the most obvious indication 
of this being that Croatian intervention in the war in Bosnia was never criticized by Washington in the 
way that Serbian involvement in the war was, even though Croatian forces were also guilty of commit-
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Theater of Operations Mission Year(s) Forces Contributed Rival Result
Bosnia Herzegovina Operation Deliberate Force 1995 400 aircraft and 5000 military 
personnel
Republika Srpska Seige of Sarejevo Lifted, 
Dayton Agreement reached
Kosovo Operation Allied Force 1998-1999 1031 aircraft FR Yugoslavia Independence for Kosovo 
(after UN governance under 
UNSCR 1244)
Macedonia Operation Essential Harvest 2001 4800 military personnel Albanian NLA Ceasefire and disarmament 
of the NLA
NATO (EU/US)
Sources: US Department of Defense (2000); NATO (2002) and Hendrickson (2005)
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ting atrocities against the Muslim and Serbian populations in Bosnia.69 That NATO forces in this case can 
be argued as acting as US “mercenaries” brokered as coercive force providers for the European states is 
supported by an examination of the force breakdown of coercive air power involved in Operation Delib-
erate Force (Table 3.2).  
Here American and European interests, while being different, were not in conflict. Europeans 
wanted stability in the Balkans and security for Eastern Europe. Americans wanted to bring a balance to 
the region and “level the playing field” as Richard Holbrooke put it.70 The operation was legitimated in-
ternationally by UN Security Council Resolutions 816 and 836 which authorized the military action.71 The 
action was legitimated by vocal and public support of the dominant political classes in NATO member 
states, like France’s Jacques Chirac, the UK’s John Major and the US’s Bill Clinton.  
Table 3.2: NATO as a Brokered Power in Former Yugoslavia 
 
Operation Allied Force likewise worked to satisfy both the goals of the US and the EU. At the 
start of the operation, US and NATO leaders said that the action was intended to stop the killing in Ko-
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Nation Total Sorties Percentage of Total
France 84 3%
Germany 59 2%
Italy 35 1%
Netherlands 198 6%
Spain 12 0%
Turkey 78 2%
UK 326 10%
US 2318 72%
NATO (NAEW) 96 3%
TOTAL* 3206 100%
Sources: Owens, 2000; Owens 2001; Global Security.org
Operation Deliberate Force: Breakdown of Air Power
*Indicates Combat Sorties only
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sovo and compel Milosevic to accept the political settlement negotiated at Rambouillet.72 Russia was 
understandably opposed to the operation because it represented an attack against a traditional ally in 
Serbia as well as an increase in NATO’s coercive power on the continent – having set a precedent for 
future operations ever closer to Russia’s historical sphere of influence.73 However, Russia was politically, 
economically and militarily unprepared to confront the US and NATO over the issue. Russia did however 
suspend its ties with NATO in protest over Operation Allied Force.74 This time, however, the US pressed 
its NATO allies to act without UN backing – a move which further alienated Russia and China. That a Ser-
bian dominated former Yugoslavia would present an obstacle to NATO’s eastward enlargement (and 
thus US geopolitical aims in the region) was understood in Moscow and Beijing.75 The operation was le-
gitimated internationally when The European Court of Human Rights refused to hear cases brought 
against NATO for the bombing of the Serbian radio and television station Radio Televisija Srbije in Bel-
grade and other action sin which over 500 civilians were killed in attacks on known non-military targets 
in spite of the fact that groups like Amnesty International labeled the attacks war crimes.7677 That the 
operation was dominated again by American military interests is clear when viewing the force break-
down of Operation Allied Force, the US having flown a total of 60% of all strike missions.78 Operation 
Essential Harvest was an instance in which US and EU goals were allied in that neither wanted to see a 
civil war in Macedonia as this would certainly threaten to reignite violence in the Balkans. The operation 
was authorized as an extension on the Kosovo Force (KFOR) under UN Security Council Resolution 
1244.7980 The target in this case was the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army, which was closely 
associated with the Kosovo Liberation Army. The Macedonian government attempted to increase the 
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intensity of US and British involvement under the guise of a rise in Islamist militancy linked to Al Qaeda 
in Skopje but these incidents were later dismissed by the US State Department as fabrications.81 
In the above listed cases, NATO serves a dual purpose as an arm of US interest in the region and 
as “brokered power” for the EU. For the US, NATO operations conform to expectations of a national 
state’s behavior in the specialization phase of extraction exerting coercive force to achieve specific mili-
tary ends. In the case of the EU, NATO operations conform to expectations of a capital-intensive state’s 
behavior in the brokerage phase of extraction of one allows that NATO operations in this theater, pre-
dominantly staffed and funded by the US military were undertaken to strengthen NATO and increase its 
credibility in the realms of humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping and “vindicate US leader-
ship”.8283  
The operations served state-making purposes in both the US and the EU, but because in both 
cases US military forces were the primary means for exercising coercive force, the operations served 
those purposes in different ways and to different degrees. Public pressure in the US to cut debt, draw 
down US military involvement abroad and increase government accountability was manipulated by the 
Republican Party in 1994 to win back control of Congress. As part of their Contract with America Repub-
lican Congressional leaders proposed the National Security Restoration Act of 1995 (HR 7) which made 
several demands on the Department of Defense and President Clinton, including that American forces 
would never be placed under foreign command and would only be deployed where US security interests 
were at stake.84 Anticipating the popularity of the act, which passed the House but failed the Senate, 
President issued a Presidential Decision Directive 25 which placed certain criteria on deciding whether 
or not to deploy American military forces in peacekeeping operations, including that the mission must 
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have the support of American allies – politically, financially and operationally; advance U.S. interests; 
result from a threat to international peace and security; and have clear, realistic objectives.8586   
In an attempt to win public support for military operations in the former Yugoslavia, President 
Clinton and his allies in Congress and the American media began likening the genocide in Bosnia to 
crimes perpetrated by the Nazis and the deployment of American forces in the war-torn Balkans to the 
American occupation of Germany following World War II.87 Opponents likewise likened American in-
volvement in the former Yugoslavia to the quagmire in Vietnam.88 Failing to win a mandate for military 
action, President Clinton conducted American operations in Bosnia and Kosovo through the use of Exec-
utive Orders, rendering the War Powers Resolution a “dead letter” by putting Congress in the position of 
defunding an ongoing American military operation – never a popular move.89 Incidentally, this expansion 
of American presidential power to make war was later cited as justification for several controversial ac-
tions in the War on Terror. Most of the soldiers called up to serve in the Balkans as peacekeepers were 
reservists and national guardsman – civilian soldiers – and the Department of Defense, in recognition of 
the new claims these civilians would have for benefits, rendered veterans of operations in Bosnia and 
Kosovo eligible for healthcare and other benefits under Veterans Administration.9091 Operations within 
the former Yugoslavia through 2004 cost roughly $9.566 billion, which was paid for through supple-
mental appropriations added to the federal budgets for each year of operation and thus adding to the 
US debt (Table 3.3). 
European state-making as a result of the war in the Balkans was very different. The beginning of 
European involvement in the Balkans came with the London Conference in 1992 which cited UN Security 
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Council Resolution 771 and others in calling for international armed intervention in Bosnia – which 
would later be taken up NATO per UN Security Council Resolution 743, which created the United Na-
tions Protection Force (UNPROFOR).9293 At the time, European public opinion supported an intervention 
by a bare majority but favored the United States or NATO taking the lead role in operations.94 As Euro-
pean military capacities in conducting international peacekeeping operations were severely limited, 
American forces conducted the bulk of operations. Operations in Kosovo were unique in that NATO took 
unilateral action in defiance of the UN and the US, with the support of major European allies, again con-
ducted the bulk of operations in Kosovo.95 At the height of the operations in Kosovo, NATO leaders used 
the opportunity presented by the 50th annual NATO Summit to launch the foundations of the Berlin Plus 
Agreement which would allow EU member states to draw on NATO military capabilities during opera-
tions.96 Additionally, the EU continues to bargain for US support in Kosovo against Russian interests by 
allowing for UN, NATO, OSCE and EU cooperation in post-conflict reconstruction efforts.97 
An EU representative who spoke on condition of anonymity confirms that member states of the 
EU, while from time to time expressing a desire for increased autonomy, are happy continuing to rely on 
NATO to provide security and defense capabilities for Europe and that defense might, in twenty years’ 
time or so, be an area where members of the European Council might be willing to entertain an altera-
tion to that arrangement.98 The Stabilization and Association Agreement was launched in 1999 with the 
stated goal of preparing the western Balkan states for eventual NATO and EU membership, resulting in 
Slovenia’s membership in NATO in 2004 and Croatia’s membership in NATO in 2004 and the EU in 
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2013.99100 Since operations in the Balkans were taken over EUFOR Althea with NATO support, many joint 
statements on the need for continued EU-NATO partnership have been issued, referencing the Balkans 
specifically and reiterating a commitment to “preserve stability and to support the reforms needed to 
move the region forward on its path to Euro-Atlantic integration.”101 As the US by itself contributes 25% 
of NATO’s overall budget and as only three other states meet their contribution targets, responsibility 
for debts incurred for operations in the former Yugoslavia is bourn mainly by the US102103. 
Table 3.3: War-making as State-Making in the Former Yugoslavia  
 
3.1.2 Afghanistan 
US operations in Afghanistan and by extension Pakistan conform precisely with the expectations 
of the behavior of a national state in the specialization phase of extraction. American military force is 
brought to bear to achieve specific ends and the size of the operations is consistent with war-making on 
scale of occupation to achieve those ends (Table 3.4). The stated goals of the US regarding the invasion 
of Afghanistan were as follows: providing a retaliatory response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
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Civilianizing Step US State-making EU State-making
Bureaucracy Creation National Security Reform Act/Presidential Decision 
Directive 25
London Conference (Bosnia)/NATO Decision in 
Kosovo
Bargaining Attempts by elites to influence public opinion Public opinion favors US/NATO involvement; UN, 
NATO, OSCE and EU cooperation for rebuilding 
Kosovo
Bureaucratic Expansion Expansion of war powers through Executive Order Stabilization and Association Agreement/50th NATO 
Summit
Claims Honored Title 38, United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 
1710(e)(1)(D) and VHA Directive 2005-20, among others
Joint Statements honoring EU-NATO partnership
Economic Expansion US DOD $9.566 Billion (1998-2004) US single largest contributor
War-making as State-making in Former Yugoslavia
Sources: PBS 1995, White House 1994, Michelson 1998, Yoo 1999, Department of Veterans Affairs 2005, Cornell Law School 2013, Bowman 
2003; The Independent 1992, UN 1996, Sobel and Sheraev 2003, Roberts 1999, NATO 1999 and 2013
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2001 as justified under international law; to remove the Taliban from power; to bring to justice those 
responsible for planning the 9/11 attacks; and, to establish a democratic regime in the Middle East.104105 
Operations towards these goals were legitimized internationally by citing Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
which states that, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collec-
tive self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”106 It should be not-
ed however that no specific UN Security Council resolution was ever adopted explicitly authorizing US 
operations in October of 2001when the invasion was initially launched and there is debate as to the le-
gality of the war in Afghanistan.  
There is also speculation that the invasion of Afghanistan had been planned as far back as 1998 
when plans to build the Unocal Pipeline through Afghanistan were halted following a series of attacks 
carried out against terrorist training camps supported by the Taliban107. US officials were quoted as hav-
ing expressed a desire for a pro-Western government in Afghanistan as early as 1998 at a Congressional 
hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and The Pacific of The Committee on International Relations 
of the House of Representatives: 
Mr. BEREUTER. Switching geography slightly, what is the status of pro-
posals by Unocal and others to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan 
to Pakistan? 
Mr. GEE. Perhaps the Unocal witness can give you more detail. I do un-
derstand that they do have an agreement with the government of 
Turkmenistan. They have also been in discussions with the various fac-
tions within Afghanistan through which that proposed pipeline would 
be routed. The U.S. Government's position is that we support multiple 
pipelines with the exception of the southern pipeline that would transit 
Iran. The Unocal pipeline is among those pipelines that would receive 
our support under that policy.  I would caution that while we do support 
the project, the U.S. Government has not at this point recognized any 
governing regime of the transit country, one of the transit countries, Af-
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ghanistan, through which that pipeline would be routed. But we do 
support the project.108 
 
Speculation that 9/11 was merely a pretext for the projection of US coercive power in Afghanistan was 
further fueled by reports that the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, long-standing enemies of the Tali-
ban, had been supported by the US and Indian militaries during several skirmishes in the Bamyan prov-
ince against Pakistan-supported Taliban forces.109 Whether US operations in Afghanistan were motivat-
ed by the need to eliminate a threat to security after 9/11 or whether 9/11 was the justification the 
American public needed to support already conceived battle plans to serve the interests of the holders 
of capital is of little consequence to this thesis, it is merely pointed out that either possible explanation 
fits the theoretical model proposed. 
Operations in Pakistan, though not normally tied to the US war in Afghanistan, are also linked to 
either set of competing interests. In the first scenario, targeting militants from Al Qaeda, the Taliban and 
other jihadist organizations who have sought refuge beyond the theater of operations of Operation En-
during Freedom serves the goals of ensuring that the Taliban do not return to power and to protect the 
fragile democracy developing in Afghanistan. In the second scenario, targeting militants would continue 
to erode Pakistani influence in the region thus clearing the way for American capitalists to pursue inter-
ests in the region in an updated Great Game for the 21st century. 
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Table 3.4: The Long Reach of the Hyperpower 
 
Whether or not drone warfare is the most effective way to serve either set of these interests is 
again not the focus of this thesis. But the actions, albeit of dubious legal character, have been legitimat-
ed by a lack of strong UN condemnation in this area – while UN inspectors criticized the US as being the 
largest perpetrator of targeted killings in the world and faulted the US for failing to take adequate steps 
to safeguard civilian lives they nevertheless indicated that the attacks might be justified under interna-
tional law as self-defense.110 Similarly, while the killing of Osama bin Laden on Pakistani soil accom-
plished the long-standing and publicly stated goal of bringing the mastermind of the 9/11 and US em-
bassy bombings to justice, it violated Pakistan’s sovereignty, again in contradiction to international law 
but was widely supported by European leaders, thus legitimating the action.111 
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Theater of Operations Mission Year(s) Forces Contributed Rival Result
2002 5200
2003 10400
2004 15200
2005 19100
2006 20400
2007 23700
2008 30100
2009 50700
2010 63500
2011 63500
2012 63500
Average 33209
Theater of Operations Mission Year(s) Drone Attacks Conducted Rival Result
2004 1
2005 3
2006 2
2007 4
2008 36
2009 54
2010 122
***2011 73
2012 48
Total 343
* Combat ongoing
** Pakistan's "Drone War" is considered here to be an extension of operations in Afghanistan
*** The attack on Bin Laden's Compound occurs during this time
Operation Enduring FreedomAfghanistan Taliban and Al Qaeda Combat Ongoing
"Militants" 2146 "militants" 
killed; 282 civilians 
killed; 270 persons 
of "unknown" 
status killed; 
Osama bin Laden 
killed
Drone War**Pakistan
US Operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Sources: Belasco 2009 and New American Foundation 2013
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As before in the former Yugoslavia, EU involvement in Pakistan has been through the UN creat-
ed International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) (Table 3.5). The goals of the ISAF are “to enable the 
Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop new Afghan security 
forces to ensure Afghanistan can never again become a safe haven for terrorists.”112 ISAF total strength 
as of 2012 was 87,207 military personnel113. Also, similarly to operations in the former Yugoslavia, EU 
member states represented in NATO do contribute to ISAF forces but nowhere near as substantially as 
does the US (Table 3.5). ISAF operations in Afghanistan have continued to receive support from the EU. 
IN 2005, a joint declaration issued by the EU and Afghanistan stated: 
The European Union and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Af-
ghanistan are committed to a secure, stable, free, prosperous and dem-
ocratic Afghanistan as laid out in the Afghan Constitution adopted on 4 
January 2004 [14 Dalwa 1383]. Both parties wish to see Afghanistan play 
a full and active role in the international community and are committed 
to building a prosperous future free from the threats of terrorism, ex-
tremism and organized crime.114 
 
In an accompanying press release, the Council of the European Union spoke of the continued 
need to fight international terrorism and narcotics trafficking and to continue disarming militant groups, 
obviously at least in large part through continued efforts of the ISAF as Afghanistan’s own security forces 
were not yet adequate to assume sole responsibility for the tasks at the time the declaration was an-
nounced. Domestic elites in the EU stood to gain much from fighting terrorism in Afghanistan. Other 
than the obvious security concerns, as previously indicated Afghanistan stood to be a major transit point 
for oil and natural gas from the Caspian Sea, allowing the EU to lessen its dependence on Russian oil and 
natural gas. Indeed, completion of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, pro-
posed by the Asian Development Bank and referred to as a new “Silk Road”, would open up possibilities 
for exploitation of Caspian Sea fossil fuels that would circumvent Russia’s influence in the region. 
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Table 3.5: NATO as Brokered Power in Afghanistan 
 
 
The EU’s Energy Roadmap 2050 speaks to the need to “secure and diversify its supply of fossil fuels 
while at the same time develop cooperation to build international partnerships on a broader basis” and 
overdependence on Russian fossil fuels has long been viewed as a threat to EU energy security.115 
 In response to the terrorist attacks of 2001, US President George W. Bush took many steps to 
expand the bureaucratic power of the state. Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military 
Force (AUMF) three days after the attack with only with only one “nay” vote.116117 In October of that 
year, the PATRIOT Act was passed authorizing enhanced domestic security measures against terror-
ism.118 That same month, President Bush created the Office of Homeland Security, which later became 
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Theater of Operations Mission State Troops Contributed Rival Result
Belgium 180
Bulgaria 416
Czech Republic 182
Denmark 317
Estonia 160
France 266
Germany 4400
Greece 3
Hungary 354
Italy 2825
Latvia 141
Lithuania 240
Luxembourg 10
Netherlands 400
Poland 1177
Portugal 165
Romania 1077
Slovakia 199
Slovenia 60
Spain 856
UK 7700
Total EU 21128
Total US 60000
Source: NATO 2012
EU Contributions to NATO ISAF (as of 2012)
Afghanistan International Security 
Assistance Force
Taliban and Al Qaeda Combat Ongoing
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the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).119 These acts were not without controversy. The AUMF 
was cited by the Bush Administration as legal justification for increased domestic wire surveillance as 
well as the creation of military tribunals capable of trying “enemy combatants” in military tribunals 
without the benefit of habeas corpus or due process.120121 The PATRIOT Act has led to an expansion of 
government powers with regard to searches, as noted in United States v. Jones, in which federal agents 
placed a GPS device in Antoine Jones’ car without warrant and without his knowledge in an investigation 
unrelated to terrorism or the War in Afghanistan.122 The DHS has also come under fire for the elimina-
tion of collective bargaining rights for its employees, citing national security concerns.123 
 As controversy mounted over these measures, the Bush Administration attempted to bolster 
public opinion by sending officials to friendly venues and media outlets in an effort win popular support 
and gain domestic legitimacy for the actions taken.124 Vice President Cheney, in 2004, went on record on 
Fox News and said, “We use these tools to catch embezzlers and drug traffickers and we need these 
tools as well to hunt terrorists.”125 Even after the election of Barack Obama, largely on the promise to 
curb perceived abuses at the hands of the AUMF and the PATRIOT Act, the US federal government con-
tinues to take steps to increase the power of the national security apparatus by continuing and expand-
ing domestic surveillance and search capabilities, authorizing indefinite detention of “enemy combat-
ants” as well as the assassination of American citizens abroad.126 An average of 33,000 American troops 
per year have served in Afghanistan from 2002-2012. In an effort to honor the claims of these men and 
women, the Bush Administration passed the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008 
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which expanded benefits to combat veterans serving in active duty since 2001.127 On occasions when 
public opinion has ebbed lowest with regard to national security measures or the cost of war, admin-
istration officials for both Presidents Bush and Obama have framed the issue as a choice between safety 
and strength and vulnerability and weakness. Operation Enduring Freedom has cost the US nearly $642 
Billion since 2002 – nearly 4% of the total national debt128 (Table 3.6). 
 As before in the former Yugoslavia, EU member states deployed military forces in Afghanistan 
through NATO, this time authorized by the UN’s creation of the ISAF. And again, as before, the US con-
tributed the bulk of the force (Table 3.5). Heads of state in EU member states used the increased public 
fear of terrorism in the wake of 9/11 to win initial support for participation in ISAF deployed opera-
tions.129 Clandestinely, the EU also began cooperating with illegal rendition programs carried out by US 
intelligence agencies and military personnel in which civilians were kidnapped and detained without due 
process and transported to secret facilities within EU member states where they were either tortured or 
transferred to other locations in North Africa, the Middle East or Central Asia were they would be tor-
tured. (Figure 3.1).130  While European heads of state were publicly condemning the practice of rendi-
tion, their governments secretly cooperated with the practice – only France, Luxembourg and The Neth-
erlands declined.131 This represents bargaining on two levels: with the domestic populations of EU 
member states for political support and with the US for continued support of NATO despite pressure 
from an increasingly radicalizing right to disengage on the continent in favor of Middle Eastern and East-
ern Asian concerns.132133 
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 The Berlin Plus agreement was completed in December of 2002 which guaranteed access to 
NATO equipment, forces, planning capabilities and information to the EU but on the condition of “first 
refusal” – meaning that NATO had first to decline to intervene in a given crisis in order for the EU to take 
over – Concordia and Althea were both launched in the Balkans under the Berlin Plus framework.134135 
And while the EU has shown occasional willingness to exercise autonomy from NATO, Operation Artemis 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo being a notable example, heads of state of the EU remain satis-
fied with the terms of the Berlin Plus Agreement, which effectively outsources the bulk of EU defense 
and security to NATO.136 A majority of Europeans (58%) remain satisfied with this arrangement as 
well.137 
  
Source: Council of Europe 2006 http://assembly.coe.int/committeedocs/2006/20060606_ejdoc162006partii-final.pdf.  
 Figure 3.1: EU Complicity in US Renditions 
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Table 3.6: War-making as State-Making in Afghanistan 
 
The previously referenced 2005 joint EU-Afghanistan statement on the ISAF is a demonstration of con-
tinued EU support for US-led NATO operations in Afghanistan despite increasing numbers of European 
citizens expressing a desire to see European troop level decreased.138 As before, the US has contributed 
more to the ISAF in terms of money, troops and material than any other NATO ally. 
3.2 Response to “Civilian State” Argument 
As the evidence suggests, Europe hasn’t transitioned from garrison state to civilian state so much 
as it is contemplating a transition from brokerage to specialization. The member states of the EU already 
had their disastrous love affair with nationalization that saw the rise of conscript armies that waged 
bloody war across a continent, laying waste to empires. Sheehan and others are correct to suggest that 
Europe has left this phase of extraction far behind. But rather than juxtapose the EU and the US as being 
from Mars and from Venus – with or without the pejorative and chauvinistic implications of the analogy, 
it is much more accurate to point to a difference in method in using coercive force to achieve the de-
sired ends of the state in relation to its rivals. The EU has certainly not given up violence, as even a 
glancing study of its defense spending outlays and weapons sales would indicate. The EU is still a nuclear 
power – France and the UK possess nuclear weapons and Belgium, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and 
Turkey have access to them and could deploy them under certain circumstances. What the EU has given 
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Civilianizing Step US State-making EU State-making
Bureaucracy Creation AUMF passed and signed into law, Patriot Act signed 
into law, DHS created
UN ISAF authorization
Bargaining Attempts by elites to influence public opinion Public denunciation of rendition; Simultaneous 
cooperation
Bureaucratic Expansion AUMF citeas justification for enhanced survalience, 
erosion of civil liberties; federal employees in DHS 
stripped of collective bargaining rights 
Berlin Plus Agreement
Claims Honored Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008 EU-Afghanistan Joint Statement on ISAF
Economic Expansion FY2002 - FY 2013: $641.7 Billion US single largest contributor
Sources: Findlaw 2013, Government Printing Office 2001, Office of Homeland Security 2002, New York Times 2003, NPR 2006, CSIS 2013, 
Council of Europe 2006, McCarthy 2013, Council of the European Union 2005, and NATO 2012
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up are classical wars of conquest. Rather than conquer its European rivals, it assimilates them through 
enlargement.  Rather than engage in foreign wars of adventure, it uses NATO to pursue political, eco-
nomic and security interests abroad, and these operations involve the use of coercive military force. 
 
Source: CIA World Factbook 2013, Graphic from Visual Economics.com 
Figure 3.2 Civilian State or “Mars Rising”? 
 4     CONCLUSIONS 
 The evidence gathered from analyzing operations in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan have 
shown the US to behave as a national state in the specialized phase of extraction. This finding is not un-
anticipated nor is it ground-breaking. However, the evidence also demonstrates that the EU behaves as 
a capital-intensive state in the brokerage phase of extraction. In both cases, the EU relied on a predomi-
nantly foreign force – NATO, operationally dominated by the US – to execute peacekeeping operations. 
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In both cases, the EU relied on outside entities, the UN, the US, the European Court of Human Rights, to 
legitimate it’s actions thus refusing to act unilaterally or independently. In both cases, state-making 
mechanisms actually devolved power away from Brussels, as seen in the 50th NATO summit which led to 
the Berlin Plus Agreement and EU support of rendition arrangements. And while interests of EU elites 
were certainly served by both operations, making way for EU enlargement in the Balkans and reducing 
security threats from international terrorism, these interests were served at the cost of autonomy and 
independence for the EU. As indicated previously by the interviewed EU official and public opinion data, 
Europeans actually want this arrangement. If Moravcsik’s theory on liberal intergovernmentalism is cor-
rect, then it is not unrealistic to assume that the operational dominance of NATO by the US would trans-
late into increased influence by the US over EU security and defense policy under the current arrange-
ment. This finding is important because it to provides insight as to how the EU behaves in the realm of 
international relations: it is neither garrison state nor civilian state nor are Europeans “from Venus.” The 
EU has outsourced its war-making capabilities to the US through NATO.  
If the EU were too fall victim to a terror attack on the scale of 9/11, it would be incapable of 
launching a military response on the scale of the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 without the help of 
NATO. This reality has not been lost on political elites and the dominant classes within the EU who con-
tinue to support and advocate for a more robust and independent military capability. Like the founders 
of the US at the Constitutional Convention of 1789, leaders in the EU are faced with the reality that con-
tinued fragmented sovereignty within the EU may be a threat to continued security for Europe. The evi-
dence provided by case study indicates that the EU fits the model of a capital-intensive state in that it 
maintains a monopoly on the coercive use of force abroad – i.e. war-making –but that such a use of 
force depends on the approval of NATO, an organization operationally dependent on the US. That 
peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions can serve the same purposes as classical war-making has 
been demonstrated, as they are conducted only when the needs of the dominant elites are met by the 
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operation in question, either directly or indirectly. To assume otherwise would be to fall victim to what 
terms a “serious delusion of benevolence.”139 
What this can indicate about the future of European integration lies in an analysis of the fates of 
Venice or the Dutch Republic – both of which succumbed in rivalries with coercive intensive or national 
states and nationalized phases of extraction. But even if the EU does not succumb to some external rival 
in the classical sense, a resurgent Russia for example, the transition to national state and the specializa-
tion phase of extraction are crucial to state building because this transition has the paradoxical benefit 
of concentrating decision making authority within a centralized hierarchy while also making that hierar-
chy more accountable to civilian elites who are able to exert control over the state through political 
means. It is thus both more robust and more accountable simultaneously. Lessons from the American 
example abound – the inadequacy of the US under the Articles of Confederation to deal with the Barba-
ry Pirates, Shays’ Rebellion and Great Britain between 1778 and 1789 can serve as instructive for the EU. 
Perhaps Europe’s experience with the horrors of empire will make it a more responsible global power. 
Tilly’s theory as applied to the EU does make one thing clear: the analogy between the EU of to-
day and the US under the Articles of Confederation may be an accurate one. The EU cannot form a co-
hesive and unified defense and security policy while unanimity is required for decision-making in these 
competencies. This would be like the US requiring the planning input, permission and operational sup-
port of all 50 governors before launching a military operation. Additionally, Tilly’s theory demonstrates 
that for western states, war-making actually reduced democratic deficit by making the state dependent 
on and accountable to domestic elites and eventually populations. And while states may circumvent 
popular authority from time-to-time, as seen in the use of Executive Orders to launch operations in the 
former Yugoslavia, large disapproval can lead to policy changes and even electoral defeat for those deaf 
to popular will, as evidenced by Senator McCain’s presidential defeat in 2008 in part because of his re-
                                                          
139
 Gibbs 2007 
38 
fusal to discuss drawing down operations in Iraq. Ambassador De Almeida may well have been correct 
when he asserted that defense could be the next frontier of integration in the EU for a number of rea-
sons, including that centralizing and specializing war-making capabilities within the EU could lead to a 
more civilianized state, perhaps even realizing the dreams of Victor Hugo and Winston Churchill in finally 
creating a United States of Europe. 
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APPENDICES  
Appendix  
M.D. Shea 
Interview Conducted 8/3/2013 12:00pm EST 
Questions for EU Official, Washington DC: 
 
May I have your permission to put my phone on hands free so that I may type notes during our conver-
sation? 
 
Yes 
 
May I have your permission to cite relevant parts of this conversation in my research? 
 
Yes, but as a non-attributable source 
 
For the purposes of citation, what is your name and title? 
 
An EU Official who spoke on condition of non-attribution 
 
Questions: 
 
1. If the European Union can be conceived of as a state, how would you characterize it? Would it 
be fair to draw an analogy between the modern Union and the Dutch Republic of the 16th and 17th cen-
turies or the United States under the Articles of Confederation in the 18th Century (most revenue comes 
from GNI of each member state – UK rebate an example of state power)? 
 
Some characteristics associated with states. Trade policy, defense policy (community compe-
tence). Sui generous organization. Unique organization – flag, anthem, treaties, bill of rights, 
etc., single legal personality (per treaty) which are all characterized as state behavior . . .. There 
may be academic literature on this and some have made this analogy but I am not qualified to 
comment on this. 
 
2. In 2012, Miliband said, “As the Balkans wars in the 1990s demonstrated, unless Europe can de-
velop its own capabilities, it will be consigned always to wait impotently until the US and NATO are 
ready and able to intervene.”   Under what scenarios can you imagine the European Union meeting the 
Headline Goals and creating a unified military capable of fulfilling all of the Petersburg Tasks, including 
so-called high end combat operations? 
 
Targets have not been met – headline goals have come and gone. Battle groups on call. EU re-
serves the right to conduct high-intensity combat tasks, but these have not been undertaken. In 
these cases, NATO is often recognized as the institution which best meets coercive force needs 
(former Yugoslavia). See Saint Malo Declaration . . .. EU military capabilities are distinct from 
NATO but more or less complementary. There is not a desire among EU member states to do 
away with NATO, most countries look to NATO to provide defense. Territorial defense is still very 
much NATO’s prerogative. 
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3. How does European reliance on NATO (per NATO-EU Declaration on European Security and De-
fense Policy, Treaty of Lisbon 2,49,c,7 for example) for defense make the establishment of a European 
military more or less likely? 
 
“Risky business to trade in identity through institutions.” Legitimacy creates institutions not the 
other way around. See previous. Capability building at the state level and then these assets are 
put to the disposal of NATO. See European Defense Agency for addressing European collective 
defense needs. Statistics on this on European Defense Agency website. US has a preponderance 
of influence in NATO and this is not a bad thing. 
 
4. It is hard to imagine a hypothetical EU Army engaged in empire building or wars of foreign ad-
venture. However, as the EU is built on ideas like “peace, tolerance, democracy and human rights,” is it 
possible that peacemaking and/or humanitarian intervention under Responsibility to Protect could fall 
under the purview of this future hypothetical EU Army? What might these operations look like and un-
der what circumstances would they be undertaken? 
 
CSDP doesn’t rely on a standing military force per se. Rapid Reaction Force (battle groups 1,000 – 
2,000). They have never been used. This requires political will and unanimously through Europe-
an Council. Typically been in Africa, East Timor, Balkans and these have been civilian missions 
where NATO has not typically been active. (For EU missions see Concordia, Althea, etc.). Division 
of labor between EU and NATO. 
 
5. How would the existence of a unified EU Army effect future enlargement? 
 
Harmonizing defense capabilities first and priorities. Berlin + Agreement, member states would 
have to “beef up the Brussels structures” first. National veto still with regard to military capabili-
ties – while NATO operates on a consensus rule. These are high politics issues and this would re-
quire another treaty and there is not an appetite for another treaty in Brussels at the moment. 
 
 
